This July, while the rest of us were tuned in to the World Cup, remarkably, the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) delivered a hat-trick of its own: three football-related judgments. Beyond the beautiful game, they shared a common question, namely, how to reconcile the regulatory and disciplinary autonomy of football governing bodies with EU law.
Two of those decisions, Rogon and RRC Sports, brought the CJEU back to the Wouters/Meca-Medina framework and tested its application to sports federation rules reaching well beyond the federation’s own members. The third, FIGC/CONI, approached sporting autonomy from a different angle, examining the disciplinary autonomy of sporting bodies and the judicial safeguards that must accompany it.
A quick refresher: Wouters and Meca-Medina
In Wouters, the CJEU held that a decision of an association of undertakings restricting the freedom of action of its members escapes the scope of Article 101 TFEU[1] where its restrictive effects are inherent in, and proportionate to, a legitimate objective connected with the overall context in which the decision was taken.[2]
Meca-Medina extended that reasoning to sport. The CJEU rejected the proposition that the International Olympic Committee’s (“IOC”) anti-doping rules fell outside competition law simply because they were “purely sporting” in nature.[3] Instead, their compatibility with competition law depended on whether their restrictive effects were inherent in, and proportionate to, the legitimate objective of combating doping to ensure fair competitive sport.[4]
Importantly, the Wouters/Meca-Medina framework, as clarified by the CJEU in Diarra and Tondela(two other football cases), applies only to restrictions of competition by effect and cannot be relied upon where a rule constitutes a restriction of competition by object.[5]
Rogon and RRC Sports, oddly delivered one week apart, tested the reach of the framework in the regulation of players’ agents.
Rogon: when federation rules reach beyond the federation
In Rogon, the preliminary reference from the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice, Germany) arose from a dispute between providers of players’ agent services and the Deutscher Fußball-Bund (“DFB”), over its rules, the Reglement für Spielervermittlung (“RfSV”), governing the activity of players’ agents. Crucially, the agents affected by those rules were not themselves members of the DFB.
The referring court accordingly asked (i) whether the Wouters/Meca-Medina exception could apply to federation regulations that, while addressed to members, also governed third-party undertakings outside the federation, and (ii) if so, whether the proportionality of such regulations had to be assessed provision by provision or by reference to the regulations as a whole.[6]
On the first question, the CJEU ruled that the Wouters/Meca-Medina exception can apply to federation regulations that, while addressed to members, also govern the use of services provided by third-party undertakings, provided that they:
i. were adopted by the federation acting as an undertaking or association of undertakings and are capable of affecting trade between Member States;
ii. do not restrict competition by object; and
iii. pursue a legitimate public-interest objective and are proportionate to its pursuit.[7]
On this point, the CJEU did not break entirely new ground. As the CJEU itself noted, it had already accepted, in other professional contexts, that the Wouters/Meca-Medina framework may apply to regulations adopted by a professional organisation for its members even where those regulations affect third parties – in those cases, the members’ clients.[8] Rogon’s contribution is to extend that reasoning to the sports federation context.
The fact that the rules reach beyond the federation’s membership is neutral to both the object/effect classification and the justification assessment. It neither entails nor excludes a finding that the regulations restrict competition by object or effect,[9] nor does it relieve the regulations of the justification test or prevent them from satisfying it.[10] Each question must still be assessed on its own terms.[11]
On the second question, the CJEU held that proportionality need not be assessed provision by provision but may instead be assessed by reference to a set of provisions pursuing a distinct objective or producing a distinct effect.[12]
The key takeaway from Rogon is therefore that the reach of sports federation rules beyond the federation’s membership does not, in itself, preclude application of the Wouters/Meca-Medina exception. Rules affecting non-members may still benefit from that exception, provided that they do not restrict competition by object and that any resulting restrictions are appropriate, necessary and proportionate to the pursuit of a legitimate public-interest objective. Whether the RfSV actually satisfied those requirements, including the object/effect classification and the ultimate proportionality assessment, was left to the referring court.[13]
Notably, the CJEU’s formulation of the proportionality test — focusing on whether the measures are appropriate, whether equally effective but less restrictive alternatives are available, and whether their restrictive effects are disproportionate, in particular by eliminating all competition on the relevant market[14] — also shows some convergence with Article 101(3) TFEU, as discussed further below in the context of RRC Sports.
RRC Sports: the exception meets FIFA’s rulebook
In RRC Sports, also a preliminary reference from a German court – this time the Landgericht Mainz (Regional Court of Mainz) – a similar question arose in connection with FIFA’s Football Agent Regulations (“FFAR”). The FFAR, adopted at the end of 2022, prompted widespread opposition among agents and a series of legal challenges against FIFA and the national football associations responsible for their implementation, including proceedingsin Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Spain and the UK, as well before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (“CAS”), with differing outcomes. Injunctions were granted in Germany (Dortmund) and Spain and rejected in Belgium and the Netherlands,[15] while the UK challenge succeeded before an FA arbitration tribunal rather than through an ordinary court injunction.[16] Following the German injunction, and in order to avoid fragmented implementation of the FFAR, FIFA temporarily suspended the application of the affected rules pending the judgment now delivered by the CJEU.[17] For more on the FFAR, see our earlier blog post.
The reference arose from an action for injunctive relief brought by FT, a players’ agent, and RRC Sports GmbH, a company of which he was managing director, against FIFA, seeking to prevent it from implementing thirteen rules contained in the FFAR and the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (“RSTP”). The referring court asked whether those rules were compatible with EU competition law, the freedom to provide services and the GDPR, and, as in Rogon, whether the Wouters/Meca-Medina exception could apply, this time in light of the rules’ economic character.
The CJEU first confirmed that Article 165 TFEU does not carve sport out of EU economic law, and that agent services, being remunerated and affecting clubs’ competitive strength, do not qualify for the narrow non-economic “purely sporting rule” exception. The FFAR therefore fall within Articles 56, 101 and 102 TFEU.[18]
As in Rogon, the CJEU left the ultimate assessment largely to the referring court. It nevertheless provided more explicit guidance, identifying only two out of the thirteen provisions as restrictive by object under Article 101 TFEU: (i) a rule stripping agents of instalments not yet due if their client is transferred again, regardless of the agent’s role in that later transfer, and (ii) the “approach” rule exempting agents already tied by an exclusive contract from the two-month restriction imposed on their competitors.[19] The remaining rules – which are much more impactful for agents and their clients, including remuneration caps, the licence system, the FIFA information exchange system and multiple-representation restrictions – were not, however, found restrictive by object. They therefore remained capable of justification under the Wouters/Meca-Medina line, which, as Wouters itself shows, has never been confined to rules governing the organisation of sporting competitions.[20] Although both sides have declared victory on LinkedIn and in press releases, this, objectively, can be seen as a big win for FIFA. The burden of proof of anticompetitive effects – which is not a low hurdle – now rests with the agents that allege an infringement of Article 101(1) TFEU.
While leaving the assessment of the remaining FFAR rules in principle to the referring court, the CJEU shed further light on what may and may not constitute a legitimate objective for the purposes of the Wouters/Meca-Medina exception. First, it drew on its free-movement case law, under which purely economic reasons cannot constitute overriding reasons of general interest capable of justifying a restriction on a freedom guaranteed by the TFEU. Applying the same reasoning, it held that the objectives invoked by an association of undertakings under the Wouters/Meca-Medina line likewise cannot be purely economic in nature. It therefore rejected FIFA’s justifications that the rules were intended to remedy certain market anomalies, such as information asymmetry, hold-up strategies, and gatekeeper situations.[21] The CJEU nonetheless clarified that a regulation dictated by economic reasons can still be justified where it ultimately pursues a non-economic legitimate objective of general interest, again drawing on its free-movement case law.[22]
As regards the non-economic objectives invoked by FIFA, namely (i) defining minimum professional and ethical standards, (ii) protecting clients against agent conduct contrary to those ethical requirements, (iii) protecting poorly informed players, and (iv) strengthening contractual stability between clubs, players and coaches, the CJEU accepted the first three as legitimate objectives of general interest.[23] As regards the fourth, it accepted it only insofar as it relates to preserving squad stability within a single sporting season, drawing on Diarra and Tondela.[24] Subject in each case to the referring court verifying that the objective was genuinely, not just nominally, pursued, the CJEU found most of the remaining rules proportionate and therefore justified, save for the “approach” rules, which failed for the same inconsistency that made them restrictive by object, and one disclosure requirement found to sweep more broadly than necessary given a less intrusive alternative existed.[25]
The CJEU also considered Article 102 TFEU. Even though FIFA is not an active market participant, the CJEU found, remarkably, that FIFA holds a dominant position on both the market for agent services and the employment market for players and coaches, given the regulatory, supervisory and sanctioning powers it exercises over both.[26] This aspect of the ruling may have broader implications for organisations with similar powers, including other sporting associations and, potentially, bodies outside of sports, such as bar associations. Whether the contested rules actually abuse that position, and whether any abuse could be justified, was left to the referring court.[27]
Beyond competition law, the multiple-representation restrictions and licence conditions were found to restrict the freedom to provide services, but to be capable of justification on objectives such as avoiding conflicts of interest and protecting inexperienced players.[28] The “approach” rules would not survive that analysis, at least not on the basis of the purely economic justification offered by FIFA and their inconsistent application.[29] On the GDPR, most of FIFA’s information-sharing obligations rested on a legitimate interest, but two publication requirements failed the data minimisation requirement: the disclosure of every sanction regardless of seriousness or timing and the publication of the details of every agent transaction.[30]
Overall, RRC Sports leaves the bulk of FIFA’s regulatory architecture standing, at least conditionally: only two of the thirteen contested rules were struck down outright, while the rest survive insofar as the referring court confirms that the objectives invoked for them are genuinely, not just nominally, pursued. Notably, paragraph 179 reinforces the convergence with Article 101(3) TFEU already apparent in Rogon: the proportionality reasoning that does much of the work under the Meca-Medina analysis looks increasingly hard to distinguish in practice from aspects of an Article 101(3) analysis, while the CJEU only briefly addresses Article 101(3) itself.
Whereas Rogon and RRC Sports focused on the application of competition law, and the Wouters/Meca-Medina exception, to sports federation rules affecting third-party economic activity, the third football-related judgment, FIGC/CONI, turned instead to national legislation limiting judicial review of federation sanctions.
FIGC/CONI: disciplinary sanctions and their judicial review
In April 2022, the Italian football disciplinary prosecutor opened a case against several clubs, including Juventus, over an alleged system of artificial capital gains. Two Juventus directors received 24-month prohibitions on pursuing professional activities within the Federazione Italiana Giuoco Calcio (“FIGC”), later extended globally by FIFA and upheld by the Sport Guarantee Board of the Comitato Olimpico Nazionale Italiano (“CONI”). The directors challenged the sanctions before the Tribunale amministrativo regionale per il Lazio (Lazio Administrative Court), but under Italian law, as interpreted by the Corte costituzionale, only sports justice bodies can annul or suspend such sanctions, while the national administrative courts are confined to awarding monetary compensation. This prompted the referring court to ask the CJEU whether such sanctions were compatible with the free movement guarantees in Articles 45 and 56 TFEU and whether a judicial review system confined to compensation was itself consistent with the right to effective judicial protection[31] and to a fair trial[32] under EU law.
Advocate-General Spielmann’s Opinion of 18 December 2025 went further than the CJEU ultimately did. He pointed to the Italian sports bodies’ institutional and functional links to the FIGC and CONI, the very entities whose decisions they review, and to the manner in which their members are appointed, as reasons to doubt whether they could be regarded as sufficiently independent “courts or tribunals” for EU law purposes.[33] The CJEU did not go that far: it agreed that annulment power must exist somewhere in the system, but left it to the referring court to decide whether the Italian system meets that bar.[34]
As regards free movement, the CJEU held that a worldwide ban on pursuing a professional activity restricts the directors’ free movement but can be justified if it pursues a legitimate public-interest objective and is proportionate.[35] The CJEU considered the requirement of a legitimate public-interest objective likely to be satisfied here, given the role that financial and accounting standards play in the proper conduct of competitions.[36] Proportionality further requires the sanctions to form part of a consistent and comprehensive system aimed at ending and preventing the unlawful conduct, applied under transparent, objective and non-discriminatory criteria. As per usual, verifying whether this was the case in Italy was left to the referring court.[37]
On judicial review, the CJEU largely built on its previous case law, including Royal Football Club Seraing, confirming that individuals must have an effective remedy against sanctions restricting their EU-law freedoms.[38] This requires, at minimum, access to a court or tribunal with the power to annul the sanction and, where necessary, order interim measures.[39] That body must be independent, established by law, and offer proper procedural guarantees and effective judicial review.[40] A second level of appeal is not required – one qualifying body is enough.[41] Whether Italy’s sports justice system, or at least its final-instance decision-maker, satisfies all of those requirements is again for the national court to determine.[42]
Where the judgment breaks new ground is in extending the independence requirement to cover not only independence from the state, as is traditionally the focus in the CJEU’s judicial-independence case law, but also independence from external pressure originating from the sports associations whose acts the sports judicial bodies are called upon to review.[43]
Key takeaways
Based on the three recent cases, a (football) federation’s regulatory and disciplinary autonomy is definitely not free from EU law scrutiny, but – more importantly – can be reconciled with EU law under certain conditions.
For restrictive rules, the effects of which may extend beyond the federation’s members, the Wouters/Meca-Medina exception applies if the rule (i) cannot be characterised as an object restriction and (ii) pursues a legitimate, non-economic objective in an appropriate, necessary and proportionate manner. This should be assessed per rule category that pursues a distinctive objective, rather than as a package deal.
Disciplinary sanctions that restrict their recipients’ rights under EU law may similarly be justified on public interest grounds, but only where the sanctioning system is consistent and comprehensive, the sanctions are applied under transparent, objective and non-discriminatory criteria, and there is a genuine right to challenge them before a tribunal that is independent (including from the sports organisation imposing said sanctions), established by law, and has the power to annul them, not just award damages.
Where the above is not the case, the autonomy collapses back into an ordinary restriction on trade, with the matter likely headed to the national courts.
And what is next for the FFAR? FIFA has welcomed the judgment in RRC Sports and invited agent representatives to meet with the aim of reaching a consensual solution.[44] While the matter now returns to the referring court, the FFAR looks set to be negotiated as much as litigated, with FIFA negotiating from a position of strength: the CJEU’s confirmation that most of the FFAR provisions can, in principle, be justified gives it real leverage in those talks. For now, the ball may therefore be in FIFA’s court.
[1] Previously Article 81/85(1) of the EC Treaty.
[2] Para 97.
[3] Paras 27–34.
[4] Paras 42–47.
[5] The object/effect distinction was also at the heart of another recent — and also football-related — CJEU judgment, Tondela (C-133/24), concerning no-poach agreements. For our analysis of that judgment, see The Tondela ruling: VAR needed to decide “object” of COVID-19 no-poach?.
[6] Para 19.
[7] Para 64.
[8] Para 61, citing C-136/12 Consiglio Nazionale dei Geologi, paras 53–54, and C-427/16 CHEZ Elektro Bulgaria and FrontEx International, paras 53–55.
[9] Paras 48 and 50.
[10] Paras 50–56.
[11] Para 62.
[12] Paras 66–70.
[13] Paras 48 and 63.
[14] Para 38.
[15] FIFA, ‘FIFA Football Agent Regulations to fully enter into force as of 1 October’, available here.
[16] The Athletic, ‘FIFA regulations to cap agent fees in England blocked after agency challenge’, available here.
[17] FIFA, Circular no. 1873 FIFA Football Agent Regulations: update on implementation, available here.
[18] Paras 67, 70, 72–75.
[19] Paras 132–138, 152, 158, 170.
[20] Paras 157, 170, 176–181, 189.
[21] Paras 182–183.
[22] Para 184, citing Essent and Others, C-105/12 to C-107/12, EU:C:2013:677, paras 51, 52 and 57, and INTERZERO and Others, C-254/23, EU:C:2025:569, point 123.
[23] Paras 187–188.
[24] Para 188.
[25] Paras 190–218.
[26] Paras 244 and 261.
[27] Paras 266, 274, 279–283.
[28] Paras 288, 299–305.
[29] Paras 306–309.
[30] Paras 330–343, 370, 380–383.
[31] Article 19(1) TEU.
[32] Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
[33] Paras 103–113.
[34] Paras 113–121.
[35] Paras 60–67.
[36] Para 72.
[37] Paras 75–80.
[38] Paras 85–86.
[39] Paras 90–92.
[40] Paras 98–110, citing C-430/21 RS and C-554/21 Hann-Invest and Others.
[41] Paras 111–112, citing C-69/10 Samba Diouf, C-169/14 Sánchez Morcillo and Abril García and C-431/22 Scuola europea di Varese.
[42] Paras 113–121.
[43] Para 104.
[44] FIFA, ‘FIFA welcomes Court of Justice of the European Union decision on FIFA Football Agent Regulations’, 16 July 2026, available here.
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