Introduction
Private damages actions are now firmly established as a key tool of EU competition law enforcement. As regularly asserted by the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU” or the “Court”), damages actions are not only about compensating victims of antitrust infringements, but also about deterring anticompetitive conduct to preserve effective competition in the internal market.[1]
In the context of antitrust damages claims, like in other fields, the rules governing limitation periods are of critical importance. They determine whether a claim may succeed in full, is partially time-barred, or fails outright. For claimants, excessively short time limitations risk extinguishing claims before they can reasonably act, thereby supressing compensation and weakening deterrence. For defendants, by contrast, limitation periods are often used as the first line of defence, along with jurisdictional challenges.
Yet, more than a decade after the adoption of the Damages Directive[2], divergent approaches to limitation periods remain among Member States. [3] The lack of total harmonization generates uncertainty for both claimants and defendants, running counter to the Damages Directive’s objective of fostering a predictable and coherent framework for private enforcement throughout the EU. Unsurprisingly, the CJEU has been called upon repeatedly to resolve remaining questions in this area.
The Court’s case law to date reflects a consistent concern for effectiveness as it has so far construed limitation rules in a way that preserves the ability of claimants to seek redress, reinforcing the role of private enforcement as an essential complement to public enforcement. In its recent Heureka judgment, the Court held that the publication of a summary of a European Commission (hereafter “EC”) decision in the Official Journal of the European Union could, in some circumstances, suffice to (rebuttably) establish that a victim was aware of an infringement, thereby triggering the start of the limitation period (dies a quo).[4]
In its landmark Nissan Iberia[5] ruling, adopted last week on 4 September 2025 (hereafter “Nissan Iberia” or the “Ruling”), the Court takes its line of reasoning one step further. For the first time, it confirms that, in follow-on damages claims based on national competition authority (“NCA”) decisions, the limitation period does not begin to run until such a decision has become final, i.e., after judicial review, and the decision and its confirming judgment have been made public.[6] The Ruling therefore settles a critical issue in the antitrust private enforcement field, while strengthening antitrust victims’ rights.
In this blog, we begin by setting out the background to the dispute which gives rise to the Ruling (I), before turning to the key aspects of the Court’s reasoning (II). We then conclude with the practical implications of the judgment for claimants and defendants in antitrust damages litigation (III).
I. Background to the dispute
On 23 July 2015, Spain’s competition authority (CNMC) held that several car manufacturers, including Nissan, had participated in a cartel by exchanging commercially sensitive information.[7] The CNMC found that this conduct, which ended in 2013, breached Article 101 TFEU and Article 1 of Spain’s Competition Act[8].
On 28 July 2015, the CNMC issued a press release summarizing its findings, and on 15 September 2015 it published the full text of the decision on its website.
A series of appeals against the CNCM’s decision were filed, prolonging legal uncertainty until 2021, when the Spanish Supreme Court finally upheld the CNMC’s findings.
In March 2023, a consumer (CP) brought a follow-on damages action before the Commercial Court No. 1 of Zaragoza against Nissan, seeking compensation for the alleged overcharge paid when purchasing a cartelised vehicle.
Nissan argued that the action was time-barred under Spanish law as it provides for a one-year limitation period which starts running after the claimant becomes aware of the infringement. According to Nissan, the limitation period started running on 15 September 2015, when the CNMC had published the full text of its decision online.
Against this backdrop, the Commercial Court No. 1 of Zaragoza referred a preliminary question to the CJEU. In essence, the question was whether, under EU law, a person claiming to have suffered harm, could be regarded as possessing the requisite information to bring an action for damages before the NCA’s decision had become final.[9]
On 3 April 2025, Advocate General Medina delivered her Opinion, concluding that decisions of NCAs can only provide the necessary knowledge once they have become final.[10] In its Nissan Iberia judgment, the CJEU largely endorses the Advocate General’s analysis, while offering important clarifications on the determination of the dies a quo for private enforcement actions.
II. The Reasoning of the Court
In Nissan Iberia, the Court’s reasoning may be divided in five steps. First, it examines the temporal scope of the Damages Directive, with particular attention to Article 10 thereof (a). Second, it reaffirms established case law on the right to seek redress and limitation periods in antitrust damages actions (b). Third, it clarifies the conditions under which claimants may be regarded as having acquired sufficient knowledge to initiate private enforcement proceedings to determine when the time limitation starts running. Fourth, it underscores the requirement that judgments confirming NCA decisions must be publicly available for those decisions to be regarded as final (d). Finally, it dismisses all the arguments submitted in favour of an earlier commencement date for limitation periods (e).
a. The Temporal Application of the Damages Directive
As a first step of its reasoning, the Court confirms its case-law regarding the temporal scope of the Damages Directive. Anchoring its reasoning in Article 22(1) Damages Directive, which prohibits the retroactive application of substantive provisions, the Court reiterates that the rules provided in Article 10 Damages Directive, governing limitation periods, are substantive rules.[11]
As substantive rules, rules governing time limitations cannot be applied retroactively. Member States are therefore precluded from adopting transposition measures that would affect limitation periods inconsistently with the guarantees established by the Damages Directive. For purposes of temporal application, the Court addresses the question in casu whether the limitation period under national law has already expired before its implementation deadline (27 December 2016). That assessment, in turn, depends on the identification of the dies a quo.[12]
Furthermore, the Court recalls that, before the adoption of the Damages Directive, Member States enjoyed autonomy in this respect, subject to the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. In practice, this required national time limitation regimes to account for the complexity of competition litigation, so as not to render damages actions “impossible or excessively difficult”.[13]
Applying these principles, the Court finds in the case at hand that, at the implementation deadline, the limitation period in the Nissan Iberia case had neither commenced nor expired. The factual situation had therefore not been fully established before 27 December 2016, with the consequence that Article 10 Damages Directive applied ratione temporis. For this reason, t claimant’s action against Nissan could not, accordingly, be regarded as time barred.[14]
b. Confirmation of Case Law regarding the Right to Claim Damages and the Role of Time Limitations
Second, the Court’s reasoning is consistent with its prior case-law on the right of antitrust victims to seek redress and the role of time limitations. Relying on ASG2[15], it underlines that the effectiveness of EU competition law would be undermined if victims of anticompetitive conduct were denied the possibility of obtaining compensation. In this regard, the Court reaffirms the well-established principle set in Courage[16], Manfredi[17] and International Skating Union[18], namely that any party who has suffered harm as a result of an infringement of Articles 101 or 102 TFEU is entitled to seek damages.[19]
At the same time, drawing on Volvo/DAF Trucks[20], the Court emphasizes the dual function of limitation periods. On the one hand, they safeguard the rights of victims by ensuring that sufficient time is available to gather the information necessary to substantiate complex competition claims. On the other hand, they protect defendants from the risk of actions being brought after an unreasonable lapse of time, thereby reducing legal uncertainty and preventing indefinite exposure to liability.[21]
In that regard, the Court reiterates that the right to claim damages for antitrust harm would be rendered practically impossible, contrary to the principle of effectiveness, if limitation periods were permitted to run before both the infringement has ceased and that the claimant has acquired the requisite knowledge, or the point at which such knowledge could reasonably be imputed. The Court therefore confirms its earlier judgment in Heureka in this regard.[22]
c. Clarification of the Knowledge Requirement for Antitrust Damages Actions
Third, and most importantly, the Court examines the conditions under which a victim may be regarded as possessing the requisite knowledge to bring an antitrust damages action.
Consistent with its judgment in Heureka, it confirms that four elements are indispensable: awareness (i) of the infringement, (ii) of the harm suffered, (iii) of the causal link between the two, and (iv) of the identity of the infringer.[23] Without these elements, the effective exercise of the right to obtain redress would be rendered practically impossible. While the Court provides guidance on principle, it is ultimately for national courts to determine, on a case-by-case basis, when such knowledge can reasonably be imputed to a claimant. [24]
The Court then draws, for the first time in its case-law, a critical distinction between Commission and NCA decisions. Commission decisions, by virtue of Article 16(1) of Regulation 1/2003[25], bind national courts and are therefore capable of providing the requisite knowledge for limitation purposes.
By contrast, NCA decisions lack binding force while subject to judicial review. Until these decisions become definitive, victims cannot rely on them before national courts to establish the infringement.[26] Deciding otherwise would render damages actions excessively difficult and risk undermining the consistency of enforcement across Member States.
The Court further stresses that an appeal must be regarded as precluding the finality of a decision where it has the potential to affect the existence or the scope of the infringement, whether in its material, personal or geographic dimension. In such circumstances, the decision cannot be treated as definitive for the purpose of imputing knowledge to claimants.[27]
Accordingly, the Court concludes that where a damages claim is based on a NCA decision, limitation periods cannot begin to run until both the infringement has ceased and the decision has become definitive. Only at that point can the claimant be deemed to have acquired the knowledge necessary to bring an action for damages.[28]
d. Definitive and Public Judgments
Fourth, the Court holds that the knowledge requirement presupposes not only that an infringement decision has become definitive, but also that it has been made publicly available. Victims can be deemed to acquire the requisite information for bringing an action only once the final judgment confirming the NCA’s decision is officially published, accessible to the public, and clearly dated.[29] It is against this backdrop that the Court considers in Nissan Iberia that the Spanish competition authority’s 2015 decision became definitive only after the Spanish Supreme Court upheld it in 2021, at which point it was published in the official judicial database.
e. Suspension and Interruption of Limitation Periods
Finally, the Court dismisses all the arguments raised according to which the suspension or interruption of the limitation period could mitigate the difficulties faced by claimants.[30] In this regard, it observes that these mechanisms operate independently of appeals against NCA decisions and do not provide a reliable guarantee that the one-year period under national law will still be running by the time judicial review proceedings are concluded.[31]
As regards suspension, the Court notes that there was no indication that filing an annulment action against Spain competition authority’s decision automatically suspends the limitation period, nor that any suspension would necessarily extend until the decision becomes final.[32]
With respect to interruption, the Court acknowledges that limitation may be interrupted by certain acts under national law, such as an extrajudicial demand for compensation, the initiation of conciliation proceedings, or requests for preliminary measures to obtain evidence.[33]
However, the Court considers these mechanisms to be wholly independent of the judicial review of an NCA decision and therefore that they do not safeguard against the risk that the limitation period will expire before that decision becomes definitive.[34]
III. Key Takeaways
We draw seven main takeaways of the Nissan Iberia ruling.
Firstly, in its Nissan Iberia ruling, the CJEU holds in essence that Article 101 TFEU, read together with Article 10(2) Damages Directive and the principle of effectiveness, prohibits national rules that would lead to a situation where a damages claim may be time barred even before the appeal decision has been issued. This is because, and rightly so, a claimant cannot be deemed to possess the indispensable knowledge required to bring a damages action until such a decision has been finally confirmed on appeal and made public.
Secondly, Nissan Iberia sets out the essential rule that the mere online publication of an NCA decision does not, per se, trigger the limitation period where an appeal is pending, provided the appeal relates to the existence or material, personal or geographic scope of the infringement found in the decision. The decisive event is the point at which the decision becomes final. Only from that moment, and once the judgment has been made public, does it acquire binding probative value before the national courts. Nissan Iberia is a landmark case in so far that it renders the national case-law in some Member States inconsistent with EU law. For instance, in France, it runs counter to a recent ruling of the Paris Court of Appeal according to which “the time limitation to bring an action normally starts running after [the NCA’s] decision”[35].
Thirdly, even if the Court does not mention it explicitly, it results nonetheless from the Ruling[36] that, should the appeal lodged challenge the fine only but not the infringement per se (for instance, arguing exclusively that the NCA breached its fining guidelines), the time limitation could start running in that case already after the publication of the decision. This is because in that specific case the appeal ruling would not in any event impact or modify the NCA’s decision in terms of the existence or the material, personal or geographic scope of the infringement.
Fourthly, as far as claimants are concerned, the Nissan Iberia ruling is also beneficial as it relieves them of the pressure to commence proceedings prematurely on the basis of a NCA’s decision that could still be annulled or modified. They may instead wait until the decision has survived judicial scrutiny, ensuring that they can file their action once the irrebuttable presumption of wrongdoing and the rebuttable presumption of harm in cartel cases apply[37]. The Ruling also responds to the structural information asymmetry faced by victims of competition infringements, who often rely on infringement decisions as the only or main evidence supporting their actions and allows them to avoid having to pay for legal and expert fees before they are certain that the NCA’s decision will be upheld on appeal.
Fifthly, as far as defendants are concerned, the implications of the Nissan Iberia ruling might be perceived as mixed. On the one hand, the Ruling curtails their ability to rely on limitation arguments as an early line of defense, meaning that their potential exposure to damages claims will persist for longer periods of time. The Nissan Iberia judgment may also, in practice, increase their incentives to seek a settlements with the NCAs rather than challenge their decisions. On the other hand, the Ruling also introduces for them a clear and predictable endpoint to the time period within which they face damages actions.
Sixthly, the Nissan Iberia ruling should create discrepancies in the Member States regarding the actual point in time when the limitation period starts running. In France, for instance, an appeal (“appel”) which is an appeal in law and in fact before the Cour d’appel is regarded as an ordinary remedy, while cassation[38] which is an appeal in law only before the Cour de cassation is regarded as an extraordinary remedy. As a result, under the French law implementing the Damages Directive, NCA decisions are treated for limitation purposes as final at the end of the appeal stage — for instance, the irrebuttable presumption of wrongdoing starts running then[39] — even if they remain subject to cassation review. This means that the time limitation will start running once the “appel” ruling (and not “cassation” ruling) is published. By contrast, in Spain, as Nissan Iberia illustrates, the limitation period does not begin to run until the Supreme Court has issued its ruling. When reviewing the Damages Directive, the EU legislator may want to ensure that this aspect of the limitation period is also taken into consideration when seeking to further harmonize limitation rules in the EU.[40]
Finally, in so far as the Court requires in its Nissan Iberia ruling that the essential information in the decision and its appeal is made public, this requirement may raise practical issues in the Member States where either judicial decisions are not systematically published or the time period between the delivery of a judgment and its publication is significant. In any event, it is for the Member States to ensure that the NCA decisions and the appeal rulings reviewing them are published and accessible to the victims, allowing them to gather the necessary information to file their damages actions.
Conclusion
The Nissan Iberia judgment confirms the clear trend followed by the CJEU in its recent case-law seeking to ensure that the rules allowing to bring damages claims in general and national limitation rules in particular do not make it impossible or excessively difficult for antitrust claimants to seek redress.
By holding that limitation periods in follow-on damages actions start running only once the national competition decisions have become final and the appeal judgment has been made publicly available, the Court ensures that claimants are not compelled to litigate prematurely while appeals remain pending.
The Nissan Iberia ruling will for sure be welcomed by antitrust claimants in particular as it is one further step toward greater legal certainty and access to justice.
[1] See, for instance, CJEU, 14 March 2019, Case No. C-724/17, ECLI:EU:C:2019:204, Skanska, para. 45 and 28 January 2025, Case No C-253/23, ECLI:EU:C:2025:40, ASG2, para. 63.
[2] Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union Text with EEA relevance
[3] See, for instance, Marc Barennes, Driek Deferme & Michiel Verhulst, Limitation periods in competition law damages actions in the EU: Are further clarification and harmonisation needed? Concurrences No. 1‑2020 (Competition Law Review).
[4] CJEU, Case No. C-605/21 ECLI:EU:C:2024:324, Heureka.
[5] CJEU, 4 September 2025, Case No. C-21/24, ECLI:EU:C:2025:659, Nissan Iberia.
[6] Ibid., para. 82.
[7] S/0482/13 – FABRICANTES AUTOMÓVILES
[8] Ley 15/2007 de Defensa de la Competencia (the “Spanish Competition Act”)
[9] CJEU, 4 September 2025, Case No. 21/24, ECLI:EU:C:2025:659, Nissan Iberia, para. 42.
[10] Case No. C-21/24, Opinion of Advocate General Medina (3 April 2025), ECLI:EU:C:2019:204, Nissan Iberia
[11] Ibid., para. 44.
[12] Case No. 21/24, ECLI:EU:C:2025:659, Nissan Iberia, paras. 46 and 47.
[13] Ibid., paras. 47 and 48.
[14] Ibid., paras. 79 and 80.
[15] CJEU, 28 January 2025, Case C-253/23, ECLI:EU:C:2025:40, ASG 2, para. 63.
[16] CJEU, 20 September 2001, Case No. C-453/99, ECLI:EU:C :2001:465, Courage, para. 25.
[17] CJEU, 13 July 2006, Case No. C-295/04, ECLI:EU:C :2006 :461, Manfredi, para. 60.
[18] CJEU, 21 December 2023, Case No. C-124/21 P, ECLI:EU:C:2023:1012, International Skating Union, para. 201.
[19] Case No. 21/24, ECLI:EU:C:2025:659, Nissan Iberia, para. 54.
[20] CJEU, 22 June 2022, Case No. C-267/20, ECLI:EU:C:2022:494, Volvo/DAF Trucks, para. 45.
[21] Case No. 21/24, ECLI:EU:C:2025:659, Nissan Iberia, para. 55
[22] Ibid., para. 56.
[23] Ibid., para. 58.
[24] Ibid., para. 60.
[25] Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (Text with EEA relevance) OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, pp. 1–25
[26] Case No. 21/24, ECLI:EU:C:2025:659, Nissan Iberia,para. 64.
[27] Ibid., para. 65.
[28] Ibid., para. 67.
[29] Ibid., paras. 74-75.
[30] Ibid., para. 68.
[31] Ibid., para. 71.
[32] Ibid., para. 69.
[33] Ibid., para. 70
[34] Ibid., para. 71.
[35] Paris Court of Appeal, Carrefour, 22 January 2025, 23/04477, page 16;accessible on 7 September 2025 at: https://app.livv.eu/decisions/LawLex202500000839JBJ
[36] Para. 65.
[37] Articles 9(1) and 17(2) of the Damages Directive.
[38] Under French law, “cassation” denotes review by the Cour de cassation (the supreme court for civil and criminal matters), limited to assessing whether lower courts have correctly applied the law, rather than re-examining the facts.
[39] For a non-exhaustive list of discrepancies in the implementation of the Damages Directive, see, for instance, Marc Barennes, Driek Deferme & Michiel Verhulst, Limitation periods in competition law damages actions in the EU: Are further clarification and harmonisation needed? Concurrences No. 1‑2020 (Competition Law Review).
[40] Article L-481-2 French Commercial Code.
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